

Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN

INFO USMISSION BERLIN

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

ALL NATO CAPITALS

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY SAIGON

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

USLO PEKING

USINT CAIRO

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

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EXDIS

VIENNA FOR USDEL, MBFR; GENEVA FOR USDEL, SALT II;
HELSINKI FOR USDEL, CSCE

. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, GW, XG, XB, XC, XD, XE, XF, XG, XH, XT, XW
SUBJECT: BRANDT VISIT - US/ FRG CABINET ROOM CONVERSATIONS,
MAY 1-2, 1973 -

1. SUMMARY. ON MAY 1 THE SECRETARY CHAIRED A 1 1/2 HOUR MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL WHILE THE CHANCELLOR MET WITH THE PRESIDENT. ON MAY 2 THE CABINET ROOM DISCUSSION WAS CHAIRED BY UNDER SECRETARY CASEY SINCE THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER WERE WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE CHANCELLOR. THE MAJOR SUBJECTS COVERED IN THE CABINET ROOM WERE SALT II, EAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA AND THE NEAR EAST, EAST- WEST RELATIONS INCLUDING GERMANY AND BERLIN. THE DISCUSSION IS SUMMARIZED BELOW. A FULL ACCOUNT OF THESE CONVERSATIONS WILL FOLLOW IN MEMORANDA OF CONVERSATION. THE DISCUSSION OF ECONOMICS ISSUES IN THE CABINET ROOM IS BEING REPORTED IN A SEPARATE TELEGRAM, AS IS DISCUSSION OF CSCE AT THE SECRETARY'S MAY 1 LUNCHEON FOR SCHEEL.

2. SALT II. AMBASSADOR U. ALEXIS JOHNSON NOTED THAT THE SOVIET POSITION HAS NOT CHANGED; THEY CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THE DISPARITIES IN NUMBERS CONTAINED IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BE CONTINUED INTO A PERMANENT ACCORD. WE HAVE NOT ACCEPTED THIS POSITION BUT RATHER HAVE SOUGHT TO ACHIEVE AN EQUAL NUMERICAL CEILING ON CENTRAL SYSTEMS, WITH EQUAL
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SUB- CEILINGS FOR ICBM LAUNCHERS AND ICBM THROW- WEIGHTS.

WE HAVE MAINTAINED THAT WE WILL NOT DISCUSS FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS OR NON- CENTRAL SYSTEMS UNTIL THERE IS A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT ON CENTRAL SYSTEMS.

THE GERMANS STRESSED THE NEED FOR CLOSE CONSULTATIONS NOW THAT ISSUES LIKE FBS AND NON- TRANSFER, WHICH ARE OF DIRECT INTEREST TO EUROPE, ARE COMING UP FOR DISCUSSION. THEY MENTIONED HAVING HELD BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH FRANCE ON THESE SPECIFIC ISSUES, AND SAID THE CONSULTATIONS WOULD RESUME. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THAT IF ANY LATENT SUSPICIONS OF A PRIVATE US- SOVIET DEAL EXIST IN WESTERN EUROPE, WE

WOULD LIKE TO KNOW ABOUT THEM SO THAT THEY MIGHT BE DISPELLED. RESPONDING TO A GERMAN SUGGESTION THAT THE MBFR TIMETABLE HAD CAUSED SOME SURPRISE IN EUROPE, THOUGH NOT IN THE FRG, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WE HAD SIMPLY BRIDGED THE GAP BETWEEN MBFR AND CSCE WITHOUT GOING INTO SUBSTANCE WITH THE RUSSIANS ON MBFR.

3. EAST ASIA. MINISTER SCHEEL, WHO HAD JUST ATTENDED A GERMAN CHIEFS OF ASIAN MISSIONS MEETING IN DJAKARTA, SAID HE FOUND SOME UNCERTAINTY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ABOUT THE FUTURE US ATTITUDE. THE ASIANS ACCEPT OUR MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT BUT HAVE INCREASED AWARENESS OF THE NEED FOR US POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT. THEY ARE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE FUTURE SOVIET ROLE IN THE AREA THAN THAT OF THE PRC.

A) INDOCHINA. SCHEEL MENTIONED HAVING SENT AN AIDE (BERENDONCK) TO HANOI FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES. THE AIDE FOUND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SOMEWHAT RESERVED, THOUGH INTERESTED IN CONTACTS AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, AND SKEPTICAL ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN LIGHT OF ALLEGED US AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE CEASE FIRE VIOLATIONS. SCHEEL SAID THE FRG WANTED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ALL FOUR STATES IN THE AREA BUT ONLY WHEN PEACE HAD BEEN FIRMLY ESTABLISHED.

B) CHINA (PRC). THE FRG BELIEVES THE CHINESE ARE HIGHLY INTERESTED IN CLOSER CONTACTS WITH THE WEST IN SECRET

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THEIR OWN RIGHT AND NOT SIMPLY IN RESPONSE TO THEIR PERCEPTION OF THE SOVIET THREAT. THEY ARE, HOWEVER, DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF THE USSR AND CONCERNED THAT DETENTE IN EUROPE COULD LEAD TO INCREASED SOVIET PRESSURE ON THEIR BORDER.

C) JAPAN. THE FRG FEELS THAT JAPAN ENJOYS RESPECT, SOMETIMES ADMIRATION BUT LITTLE SYMPATHY IN THE AREA. JAPANESE DYNAMISM, ESPECIALLY IN COMMERCIAL

MATTERS, IS RESENTED ALTHOUGH THE OTHER ASIAN STATES KNOW THEY MUST RELY ON JAPAN FOR ECONOMIC HELP. SCHEEL VOICED APPREHENSION ABOUT CERTAIN POLITICAL FORCES IN JAPAN WHO ARE PLAYING CAUTIOUSLY WITH THE IDEA OF GOING INTO NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY FOR MILITARY PURPOSES. PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION IN JAPAN WOULD BRING A STRONG REACTION FROM THE CHINESE, WHO ARE SATISFIED WITH THE US NUCLEAR UMBRELLA SINCE IT OBVIATES A JAPANESE NUCLEAR BUILD- UP. JAPAN IS FEELING MORE FRUSTRATIONS BECAUSE OF DIFFICULTIES IN RECONCILING ITS TIES TO THE U. S. AND TO TAIWAN WITH ITS DESIRE FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PRC.

JAPAN IS A POWER, SUI GENERIS, AND NEEDS TO BE CONSULTED. FOR THIS REASON HE WELCOMED DR. KISSINGER' S PROPOSAL THAT JAPAN BE BROUGHT INTO THE ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP.

D) AUSTRALIA/ NEW ZEALAND. THESE STATES, IN SCHEEL' S VIEW, ARE ON THE WAY FROM BEING PRIMARILY WHITE POWERS TO BECOMING PREDOMINANTLY ASIAN POWERS. THE GERMANS SEE NO DANGER TO ASIAN STABILITY IN THIS DEVELOPMENT.

4. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT WITH THE GERMAN PRESENTATION, PARTICULARLY ON THE PRC- SOVIET RIVALRY WHICH HANOI WAS ABLE TO EXPLOIT TO ITS ADVANTAGE. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THE GOOD IMPRESSION MADE HERE BY PRESIDENT THIEU AND BY SEVERAL OF HIS FUTURE- ORIENTED YOUNG CABINET MINISTERS, PARTICULARLY THE ECONOMICS MINISTER. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT PRESIDENT THIEU WAS NOW IN A STRONGER DOMESTIC POLITICAL POSITION AND PREPARED TO TAKE RISKS IN AN ELECTION. HE DID NOT, HOW- SECRET

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EVER, FULLY AGREE WITH SCHEEL' S COMMENTS ABOUT AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND WHICH, IN HIS VIEW, WERE SEEKING TO WITHDRAW FROM THEIR OBLIGATIONS TO THEIR ASIAN ALLIES WHILE RETAINING THE U. S. GUARANTEE THROUGH THE ANZUS PACT. THE SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT WE FAVOR CLOSE COOPERATION WITH JAPAN AND SEE NO NECESSARY CONFLICT BETWEEN JAPAN' S SEEKING TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE PRC AND THE USSR WHILE MAINTAINING ITS TIES TO THE U. S.

5. SOUTH ASIA AND THE NEAR EAST. A) DEPUTY SECRETARY RUSH REPORTED ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO THE AREA WHERE HE HAD FOUND INDIA TO BE THE CENTRAL ISSUE. THE SHAH OF IRAN WAS CONCERNED ABOUT PREVENTING A POSSIBLE FURTHER DISMEMBERMENT ON PAKISTAN AND FOR THIS REASON WISHED TO STRENGTHEN IRAN' S ALREADY IMPRESSIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY CHARACTERIZED IRAN AS

POLITICALLY STABLE WITH AN IMPRESSIVE ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE. DURING HIS CONVERSATIONS IN INDIA PRIME MINISTER GANDHI HAD AVOIDED CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS WHILE EXPRESSING SATISFACTION THAT THE U. S. DID NOT INTEND TO INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE SUBCONTINENT. THE FINANCE AND FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD COMPLAINED, HOWEVER, ABOUT US ARMS SALES TO PAKISTAN. HE HAD EXPLAINED THAT IN COMPARISON WITH MASSIVE SOVIET AND FRENCH ARMS SALES TO THE AREA, OUR OWN ARE QUITE SMALL AND ARE SELF-LIMITED TO SPARE PARTS FOR EXISTING EQUIPMENT.

B) ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO DISCUSSED THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION, EMPHASIZING THAT THE PRESENT STATUS

IS ABOUT AS GOOD A SITUATION AS COULD REASONABLY BE HOPED FOR. HE SUMMARIZED OUR RECENT DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH JORDANIAN, ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN LEADERS, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE CHANCELLOR BRANDT AND MINISTER SCHEEL WOULD SOON BE SEEING THEM.

AA) JORDAN. KING HUSSEIN HAS SHOWN NEW FLEXIBILITY; HE COULD CONCEIVABLY ACCEPT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK SATISFACTORY TO ISRAEL IF THE LATTER WOULD CONCEDE HIM A SLIVER OF
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SOVEREIGNTY OVER JERUSALEM. HUSSEIN AND SADAT HAVE IN ESSENCE AGREED THAT EACH IS FREE TO MOVE TO AN INTERIM SOLUTION ON ITS OWN BORDERS, IF THE DEAL WERE RIGHT, WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE OTHER TO ACT.

BB) EGYPT. EGYPT IS SEEKING DIRECT CONTACTS WITH THE US AND DOES NOT WANT ITS VIEWS FILTERED THROUGH THE SOVIETS. UNFORTUNATELY, THE EGYPTIANS STILL WOULD LIKE SOMEONE ELSE TO REACH A SETTLEMENT ON THEIR BEHALF WITHOUT THEIR PARTICIPATION. THEY WANT A PRIOR COMMITMENT TO TOTAL ISRAELI EVACUATION OF THE SINAI BEFORE ENTERING INTO ANY KIND OF NEGOTIATIONS.

CC) ISRAEL. THE ISRAELIS ARE READY AT ANY TIME TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON AN INTERIM SUEZ CANAL SETTLEMENT WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. WE ARE PREPARED TO ENCOURAGE ISRAELI CONCESSIONS BUT OUR INFLUENCE CAN BE APPLIED ONLY WHEN NEGOTIATIONS ARE ACTUALLY IN COURSE.

6. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THAT ANYTHING MINISTER SCHEEL OR HIS GOVERNMENT COULD DO TO MAKE THE EGYPTIANS REALIZE THAT THE PARTIES THEMSELVES MUST ENGAGE IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WOULD CONSTITUTE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD PEACE. WE ARE PREPARED TO DO OUR PART. THE LONGER THE IMPASSE CONTINUES, THE HARDER IT WILL BE TO REACH A SOLUTION. IN RESPONSE MINISTER SCHEEL COMMENTED

THAT IT WAS PREFERABLE IN VIEW OF EGYPT' S STRONGER INTERNAL AND FOREIGN POSITION THAT CAIRO RATHER THAN AMMAN BEGIN INTERIM TALKS WITH ISRAEL. UNLESS THE PALESTIAN PROBLEM WERE INCLUDED IN AN INTERIM SOLUTION, HE DOUBTED IT COULD COMMAND SUPPORT IN THE ARAB WORLD. JERUSALEM WAS THE MOST COMPLICATED ISSUE OF ALL AND SHOULD BE LEFT FOR THE LAST. MINISTER SCHEEL COMMENTED THAT FORTHCOMING ISRAELI ELECTIONS MADE EARLY PROGRESS TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS QUESTIONABLE.

7. EAST/WEST ISSUES. FRG FONOFF POLITICAL DIRECTOR VAN WELL DESCRIBED PROSPECTS FOR RATIFICATION OF THE FRG/ GDR BASIC TREATY AND FOR GERMAN ENTRY INTO THE UNITED

NATIONS, NOTING THAT THE TIMETABLE FOR THE LATTER DEPENDED
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ON THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE OPPOSITION CDU/ CSU IN THE
BUNDESRAT, WHICH IT CONTROLS. IF THE CDU/ CSU INSISTS
ON BUNDESRAT CONSENT, IT COULD DELAY DEVELOPEMENTS
CONSIDERABLY. VAN WELL STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING
THE FRG REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF WEST BERLIN IN THE UN.
HE MENTIONED THAT THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES WERE
CONTINUING TO CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR THE FRG OVER THE BERLIN
CLAUSE IN VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. THE FRG
ALSO HAS A LONG LIST OF COMPLAINTS ABOUT SPECIFIC SOVIET
DISCRIMINATORY ACTS AGAINST BERLIN AND ITS RESIDENTS.
THESE ISSUES WILL BE BROUGHT TO SOVIET ATTENTION AT A
HIGH LEVEL, AS A SERIOUS IRRITANT TO FRG- SOVIET
RELATIONS. VAN WELL ALSO REVIEWED FRG RELATIONS WITH
EAST EUROPEAN STATES, MENTIONING THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN
EARLY RESOLUTION TO THE MUNICH PACT ISSUE WITH
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND CONTINUING DISTURBANCES IN BONN' S
RELATIONSHIP WITH POLAND OVER RESETTLEMENT OF GERMANS
AND POLISH DESIRES FOR INDEMNIFICATION. THE FRG
DOES NOT INTEND TO PAY INDEMNIFICATION. THE CHANCELLOR' S
TREATMENT OF THE INDEMNIFICATION ISSUE IN YUGOSLAVIA WOULD
BE A MODEL FOR THE FRG IN DEALING WITH POLAND AND ROMANIA.

8. EAST/ WEST ISSUES (CONTINUED), ASSISTANT
SECRETARY STOESEL DESCRIBED OUR EXPECTATIONS FOR THE
BREZHNEV VISIT TO WASHINGTON, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE SOME
AGREEMENTS OF A LESS SPECTACULAR NATURE THAN THOSE
REACHED A YEAR AGO IN MOSCOW. HE REVIEWED OUR CURRENT
RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND REFERRED TO SOME
TENSION IN OUR RELATIONS WITH HUNGARY AND POLAND BECAUSE
OF THEIR REFUSAL AS MEMBERS OF THE ICCS IN VIETNAM
TO CRITICIZE OR INVESTIGATE COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE
CEASEFIRE. ROGERS

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